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Abstract. A quantum key distribution system may be probed by an eavesdropper
Eve by sending in bright light from the quantum channel and analyzing the back-
reflections. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a setup for mounting such
a Trojan-horse attack. We show it in operation against the quantum cryptosystem
Clavis2 from ID Quantique, as a proof-of-principle. With just a few back-reflected
photons, Eve discerns Bob’s secret basis choice, and thus the raw key bit in the
Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 protocol, with higher than 90% probability. This
would clearly breach the security of the cryptosystem. Unfortunately in Clavis2
Eve’s bright pulses have a side effect of causing high level of afterpulsing in Bob’s
single-photon detectors, resulting in a high quantum bit error rate that effectively
protects this system from our attack. However, in a Clavis2-like system equipped with
detectors with less-noisy but realistic characteristics, an attack strategy with positive
leakage of the key would exist. We confirm this by a numerical simulation. Both the
eavesdropping setup and strategy can be generalized to attack most of the current QKD
systems, especially if they lack proper safeguards. We also propose countermeasures
to prevent such attacks.
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a method to solve the task of securely
distributing symmetric keys between two parties Alice and Bob [1–3]. The security
of QKD is based on the principles of quantum mechanics: an adversary Eve attempting
to eavesdrop on the quantum key exchange inevitably introduces errors that warn Alice
and Bob about her presence. In the last decade however, several vulnerabilities and
loopholes in the physical implementations of QKD have been discovered, and proof-of-
principle attacks exploiting them have shown the possibilities that Eve may get hold of
the secret key without alerting Alice and Bob [4–11].
In most cases, vulnerabilities and loopholes arise due to technical imperfections or
deficiencies of the hardware. For instance, no optical component can perfectly transmit,
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or completely absorb light. An optical pulse launched into a network of optic and
optoelectronic components, e.g., a QKD system, encounters several sites of Fresnel
reflection and Rayleigh scattering [12]. Some light thereby travels opposite to the
propagation direction of the input optical signal. The properties and functionality of
some component inside a QKD system may thus be probed from the quantum channel
by sending in sufficiently-bright light and analyzing the back-reflected light. This forms
the basis of a Trojan-horse attack [4, 5, 13].
Neither the concept, nor the danger of a Trojan-horse attack on QKD systems is
new [4, 5, 13]. Also, it is the Alice device that is typically considered vulnerable to
this kind of attacks since it prepares the quantum state in most QKD schemes. If a
QKD system is operating, e.g., the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1], then by
sending a suitably-prepared bright pulse inside Alice and analyzing its back-reflections,
Eve could obtain information about the setting of the polarizer [14–16] or the phase
modulator [13, 17,18] responsible for encoding the secret bit.
A simple way to detect a Trojan-horse attack red-handed is to install a passive
monitoring device at Alice’s entrance. This is usually implemented by a suitable detector
(or an array of detectors) that measures different parameters of an incoming signal and
raises an alarm whenever certain pre-characterized thresholds are crossed. However, a
similar countermeasure cannot be straightforwardly adopted for the Bob device since
it typically detects the already-quite-weak states of light coming from the quantum
channel – a passive monitoring device would introduce unwanted attenuation and bring
the secret key rates down further. Another countermeasure [4, 5, 19, 20] is to add an
optical isolator to block the bright Trojan pulse from entering; however, this is not
applicable to two-way systems such as plug-and-play schemes [21].
For the BB84 protocol, this does not pose a problem as Bob publicly declares his
basis choice, i.e., the setting of his polarizer/phase modulator. However, in the Scarani-
Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol [22, 23], the secret bit is given by Bob’s
basis choice. If Eve can surreptitiously read Bob’s phase modulator setting (= 0 or pi/2)
from the quantum channel via a Trojan-horse attack, then she acquires knowledge of
the raw key [24]. She can then apply the same operations (sifting, error correction and
privacy amplification [2,3,14]) as Alice and Bob and therefore, eavesdrop without being
discovered and hence break the security of the system.
SARG04 is more robust than BB84 against photon-number-splitting attacks [11,25],
which is useful for QKD systems such as Clavis2 [26] that employ attenuated laser
sources. In the following sections however, we show that it can be vulnerable to Trojan-
horse attacks on Bob. We believe this is the first proof-of-principle demonstration of
such an attack on a practical QKD system (although static phase readout in Alice has
been demonstrated before [4,5], the previous experiments were not real-time and did not
analyse the complete system). Furthermore, both our eavesdropping setup and strategy
are universal: with simple modifications, they could be applied against entanglement-
based, continuous-variable, or even the very recent measurement-device-independent
QKD systems [27–30] if they lack proper safeguards against Trojan-horse attacks. In
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such cases, it may be used even to break the BB84 protocol.
2. Theory and preparatory measurements
To prepare for a practical Trojan-horse attack, the eavesdropper Eve needs to know the
answers to (at least) the following questions:
(i) What time should a Trojan-horse pulse be launched by Eve into Bob?
(ii) What time would a back-reflected pulse of interest exit Bob and arrive on the
quantum channel? And with what amplitude?
(iii) What properties may be analyzed in a back-reflected pulse?
(iv) How to avoid being detected by Alice and Bob?
(v) What is the most suitable wavelength for attack?
These questions are closely interrelated, and the answers to them naturally depend
on the QKD system under attack. In this section, we address them specifically for
Clavis2, the plug-and-play QKD system from ID Quantique; or to be more precise,
with the aim of crafting and executing an attack on Clavis2-Bob while it runs SARG04.
Figure 1(a) shows the basic scheme of the attack while figure 1(b) shows the optical
schematic of Clavis2 that operates in a two-way configuration based on the plug-and-
play principle [21]. We briefly describe the principle below, and in the appendix we
discuss several (technical) details via a numerical simulation.
Bob contains both the laser and the detectors; he sends bright pulse pairs to Alice
who prepares the quantum states and sends them back to Bob. For this, she randomly
modulates the relative phase ϕA = {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} between the optical modes of each
pair, and applies an attenuation so that the mean photon number of the resultant
weak coherent pulses (returning to Bob on the quantum channel) is as dictated by the
protocol. For SARG04, the optimal value is µSARG04 = 2
√
T , where T is the channel
transmission [23]. Bob applies a binary modulation chosen randomly per pair (ϕB = 0
or pi/2, corresponding to the secret bit 0b or 1b respectively) and his pre-calibrated [10]
gated detectors measure Alice’s quantum states. The actual transmission uses the
concept of frames, a train of pulses that entirely fit in Alice’s delay line in order to
prevent errors that would otherwise result from Rayleigh backscattering [21]. A frame
in our Clavis2 system is configured to be 215µs long, while the inter-frame separation
depends on the total distance between Alice and Bob1.
Time of launching the Trojan-horse pulse
Eve launches a Trojan-horse pulse (THP) into Bob at time tE→B chosen so that the
onward pulse and/or one of its back-reflections (from some component or interface inside
Bob) travel through Bob’s phase modulator (PM) while he is applying a voltage on it.
As will be explained below, the back-reflected pulse coming out from Bob onto the
1Lower bound is provided by the delay line in Alice, which for our system results in ∼ 235µs.
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Figure 1. Basic optical schematic of the Trojan-horse attack and plug-and-play QKD
system. (a) Using the MUX, Eve multiplexes (in time and wavelength) the Trojan-
horse pulses to the quantum signals traveling from Alice to Bob for probing Bob’s
basis choice. Reflections from Bob travel back to the Trojan-horse attack apparatus
after being demultiplexed at the MUX. Eve may also replace parts of the quantum
channel (in solid-orange) with her own delay lines (in dashed-blue). (b) A folded Mach-
Zehnder interferometer operating in double pass facilitates a passive autocompensation
of optical fluctuations (arising in the quantum channel) and forms the essence of plug-
and-play schemes. Bob contains both the laser and single-photon detectors connected
to his local interferometer by means of a polarizing beamsplitter, 50/50 beamsplitter,
and circulator (henceforth referred to as the PBS-BS-C assembly). Alice employs a
Faraday mirror to reflect back the signals sent by Bob. The small black rectangles in
Bob denote a pair of FC/PC connectors inside a mating sleeve.
quantum channel then carries an imprint of whatever random phase shift ϕB had been
applied by Bob. The time tE→B is of course relative to events inside Bob repeating at
fB = 5 MHz. To be synchronized to the clock in Bob, Eve may steal a few photons from
the bright pulses traveling to Alice using a tap coupler, as shown in figure 1(a). She
can extract information such as timing and polarization from the measurement of these
photons and use it in the preparation of the THPs.
Time of arrival and amplitude of the back-reflected pulse
As illustrated in figure 1(b), Bob comprises of a miscellany of fiber-optical components.
This offers several interfaces from where (measurable) back-reflections could arise. Also,
due to the asymmetric interferometer, there may be two different paths traversable in
either directions, i.e., for the arrival of the Trojan-horse pulse into Bob, and departure
of a given reflection to the quantum channel. In essence, for a single THP sent into
Bob, multiple reflections varying in time and amplitude can be expected. By means
of repetitive measurements, a reflection-map for Bob – temporal distribution of the
back-reflection levels – can be constructed. This is a task perhaps best suited for an
optical time domain reflectometry (OTDR) device [31]. We obtained OTDR traces, or
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Figure 2. Reflection maps of Clavis2-Bob at 1550 nm and 806 nm, as seen from
Bob’s entrance. Reflections from several components close in time are color-coded.
Reflections not shown were below the OTDR sensitivity (about −83 dB at 1550 nm and
−96 dB at 806 nm). However, some important reflections below the sensitivity limit
at 806 nm were estimated by combining several measurements on parts of Bob. The
reflection level of the connectors could depend significantly (maximum variation: 3 dB)
on the cleanliness of the connectors and mating sleeves. In the scheme, small filled
rectangular blocks represent FC/PC connectors with curved polished surfaces; PM:
phase modulator, D0 and D1: avalanche photodiodes; PBS-BS-C: optical assembly
of polarizing beamsplitter, 50/50 beamsplitter, and circulator. OTDR model: Opto-
Electronics modular picosecond fiber-optic system.
reflection-maps for Bob, for three different wavelengths: 806 nm, 1310 nm and 1550 nm.
Figure 2 illustrates two of them; the traces for 1310 nm and 1550 nm were found to
be quite similar. Due to the polarizing beamsplitter at Bob’s entrance (the PBS in the
PBS-BS-C assembly), most of the reflection levels depend greatly on the polarization of
the probe light. This polarization was set to maximize the reflection from the closest
connector of the PM (see star-like shape). As indicated, the back-reflected pulse would
exit Bob around 43 ns after the arrival of the THP into Bob; tB→E − tE→B ∼ 43 ns.
The corresponding back-reflection level is around −57 dB. By sending a THP, say with
a mean photon number µE→B = 2 × 106, Eve would get a back-reflection µB→E ≈ 4.0,
i.e., with just four photons on average.
Measurement of the back-reflected pulse
Per se, any physical property in the back-reflected pulse that provides a clue of Bob’s
modulation suffices, and governs Eve’s measurement technique. If Eve uses a coherent
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laser operating at wavelength λE to prepare the THP, the state of light in the back-
reflected pulse can be approximated by a weak coherent state |α〉. The phase ϕE =
Arg(α) depends on λE, e.g., if λE = λAB ∼ 1550 nm, and Eve launches the THP so
that both the onward and back-reflected pulse make a pass through the PM while it is
active, then ϕE ∼= ϕB +pi+ϕB = pi or 0. The objective then simplifies to discriminating
between two weak coherent states having the same amplitude |α| but opposite phase,
which can succeed with a probability 1 − e−|α|2 at most (which is the probability that
the state |±α〉 is not projected onto the vacuum state). Assuming the aforementioned
case with |α|2 ≡ µB→E ≈ 4.0, the maximal success probability is 98.2%. This unknown
phase may be probed interferometerically with either a (bright) local oscillator followed
by a homodyne detector, or an attenuated coherent state (the same level as µB→E) and
a pair of single-photon detectors.
Avoiding discovery by Bob (or Alice) and other constraints
Raising µE→B would yield more photons for the measurement, allowing for a better
phase discrimination, but how do these bright pulses affect the other components in the
QKD system in general? An oddly-behaving component is a signature that could lead
to Eve’s discovery, so this issue is quite central to the success of Eve’s attack.
Bob uses a pair of avalanche photodiodes (APDs) operated in gated mode2 to detect
the legitimate photonic qubits from Alice. Eve’s bright pulses, even if timed to arrive
outside the detection gate, tend to populate carrier traps [9,33] in the APD. This ensues
in an afterpulsing effect: traps exponentially decay by releasing charge carriers that may
stimulate avalanches of current, or afterpulses, in the onward gates. These afterpulses
increase the dark count rate, i.e., result in higher number of false clicks in the APDs.
Due to this, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) incurred by Alice and Bob at the
conclusion of the key exchange will naturally be higher. Eve’s objective is to make sure
that the QBER does not cross the ‘abort threshold’ (e.g., around 8% in Clavis2 [10]) as
that would fail her eavesdropping attempt. Moreover, as characterized in the so called
after-gate attack [9], if the brightness µE→B exceeds a certain threshold, then for a THP
arriving a few ns after the gate, the APD may register a click with high probability for
that particular slot. Since Eve wants to merely read the state of the phase modulator
via a Trojan-horse pulse, she must constrain the brightness of this pulse to avoid an
undesired click in Bob’s APDs in the attacked slot. This imposes an upper limit on
µE→B, which is ∼ 2× 106 for our system [9].
As the afterpulsing is strongly dependent on the brightness µE→B and frequency
of attack fEatt (which may be lower than fB = 5 MHz), Eve would like to attack with
the dimmest-possible THPs. The lower limit is mainly decided by the probability of
success in discerning Bob’s modulation, i.e., how well can Eve’s measurement apparatus
perform as µB→E falls in the few-photon regime. Reducing fEatt implies Eve probes
only a fraction of the slots that eventually contribute to the raw key formation: she can
2Gate width for Clavis2 system is ≈ 2.0 ns [32], and gate period is 1/fB= 200 ns.
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then possess only a partial amount of knowledge of the raw key. This must therefore be
high enough to ensure a positive leakage of information at the end of the protocol, i.e.,
after Alice and Bob have distilled the secret key by estimating Eve’s information and
destroying it by means of privacy amplification.
Suitable wavelength for attack
The behaviour of most optical components is a function of wavelength. The attenuation
through fibers and back-reflectance of the connectors may also vary with wavelength.
The notable differences between the OTDR traces at 808 nm and 1550 nm, shown in
figure 2, is a testimony to this fact.
Ideally speaking, to characterize a QKD system, one should perform individual
OTDR measurements over a large spectral range that could prove feasible for mounting
Trojan-horse attacks. However, identifying such a range is not easy. Moreover, it
requires an OTDR system with a tunable source as well as a detector with a high
sensitivity over the complete range. This may not be possible in practice. Nevertheless,
we made some simple measurements using a photonic crystal fiber based supercontinuum
source [34]. The primary focus of these measurements, the details of which will be
discussed elsewhere, was to examine the spectral behaviour of Bob’s PM in conjunction
with its input and output connectors. Fortunately for the QKD system, we did not
find any reflection peaks that could have aided Eve. In fact, based on the OTDR and
supercontinuum results, the optimum attack wavelength seems to be ∼ 1550 nm.
3. Phase readout experiment
Eavesdropping setup
Here we describe our implementation of a proof-of-principle Trojan-horse attack.
Figure 3 shows the schematic of the apparatus used for reading out the unknown phase
by means of homodyne detection. For this, we disconnected Bob from Alice. A pulse
& delay generator (Highland Technology P400) was synchronized to Bob and drove
Eve’s laser at a repetition rate fEatt = 5 MHz. An optical isolator was employed to
protect Eve’s laser from reflections. Using a 50/50 (later replaced by a 1/99) coupler,
the Trojan-horse pulses were directed into Bob from port 3. The polarization of these
THPs was optimized using PC1 so that the power at the FC/PC connector (port 9,
inside Bob) after the PM was maximum.
A long fiber patchcord of an appropriate length was spliced and added to the other
arm of the coupler at port 4. The relative path difference between the back-reflected
pulse (signal path) and the local oscillator pulse (control path), as observed at the
50/50 beamsplitter of the homodyne detector, was adjusted to achieve the maximum
interference visibility. The polarization of the signal (control) pulses at the outcoupler
FC1 (FC2) could be controlled by PC2 (PC3). Using P400, the laser delay, i.e., tE→B
was changed so that the input pulse traveled through Bob’s PM while the PM was
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Figure 3. Schematic of a Trojan-horse eavesdropper. Some components in Bob are
not shown to avoid cluttering. To synchronize to Bob’s modulation cycle, we used an
electronic sync signal as shown. In an actual attack, Eve can use the method explained
in section 2 (also see the explanation of the attack strategy in the appendix).
activated. The optical pulse width, and therefore the mean photon number per pulse,
could be fine-tuned by changing τEatt, the driving pulse width in P400.
Results
As mentioned before, Clavis2 operates the quantum key exchange in frames that are
215µs long, containing Nf = 1075 modulations or slots repeating every 0.2µs. We
configured the oscilloscope to capture the output voltage of the homodyne detector and
the phase modulator voltage (obtained via an electronic tap placed inside Bob) in a
single-shot acquisition mode lasting 250µs. Figure 4 shows the time traces of Bob’s
randomly-chosen phase modulations and the output of Eve’s homodyne detector for
5 arbitrarily chosen slots in two different configurations. The first one (with a 50/50
coupler and τEatt = 3.3 ns) had mean photon numbers µLO ≈ µE→B = 108 resulting
in a mean photon number µsig ≈ 100 of the back-reflected pulses in the signal arm of
the homodyne detector. In this case, the discrimination is quite apparent as illustrated
in figure 4(a); in fact, using peak-to-peak values as a measure, correlations above 99%
were easily obtained when measured over entire Clavis2 frames.
We then replaced the 50/50 coupler with a 1/99 coupler and obtained µE→B ≤
1.5 × 106 at τEatt = 2.6 ns. In this case, illustrated in figure 4(b), the mean photon
number µsig ≈ 3 while the LO had slightly higher power than before, µLO > 108. We
also confirmed that a slot attacked with the Trojan-horse pulse never experienced a
click (except due to a dark count) [9]. A direct discrimination may not be evident by
eye, however, after integrating the homodyne pulses over a suitably chosen time-window
every slot, we obtained correlations above 90%. This is explained further in the caption,
and the corresponding output for 500 slots is depicted in figure 4(c).
Both theoretical and experimentally demonstrated discrimination probability is
above 90%, and in section 5 we shall discuss a few techniques that can increase it
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Figure 4. Results of phase readout. (a) Traces of Bob’s randomly-chosen phase
modulation (in red) and the output of Eve’s homodyne detector (in blue) for a sequence
of 5 arbitrarily chosen slots. The measurement was performed at µsig ≈ 100 and
fEatt = 5 MHz. The correlation between Bob’s modulation and Eve’s homodyne pulses
can be easily discerned. (b) Same as in (a) but with µE→B reduced so that µsig ≈ 3.
The major pulse shape observed at the homodyne detector (HD) output arises from
the slightly-imperfect subtraction of the LO. The signal is nevertheless easily extracted
by integration over a time-window (denoted by green shaded rectangle). Thus, in each
200 ns slot, a single value each for the random phase modulation and HD pulse is
calculated. (c) Series of 500 such integrated values, shifted by an arbitrary constant
merely to aid visual discrimination. Using an appropriate threshold (black horizontal
line), Eve’s estimation of Bob’s bit 0b or 1b in a given slot is correct in > 90% cases.
further. To simplify our simulation, we assume from hereon that a Trojan-horse pulse
with µE→B ∼< 2 × 106 can always accurately read the state of Bob’s PM in each
slot. Finally, note that due to fluctuations, the global phase drifts on frame-to-frame
basis, but Eve can always suitably craft her LO to homodyne another back-reflection
which passed through Bob’s PM outside the modulation width, i.e., when the PM is
inactive. This effectively allows to set her reference to ϕB = 0. Also, such phase drifts
are typically in the few-kHz regime which is of the same order as the frame rate in Bob.
4. Eve’s attack strategy simulation
To know the entire modulation sequence in Bob, Eve would have to attack the QKD
system with fEatt = 5 MHz which would result in a tremendous amount of afterpulsing
in Bob’s APDs even when µE→B ∼ 2 × 106 is chosen. A straightforward attack is
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clearly not possible. In this section, we devise an attack strategy that may still allow
Eve to probe Bob’s PM frequently enough to obtain more raw key than Alice and Bob
estimate her to possess during the calculation of the secret key fraction [23]. Neither is
the expected detection rate of Bob severely affected, nor the QBER crosses the abort
threshold. In other words, a non-zero portion of the final secret key is leaked to Eve
without her being discovered.
To motivate the basic idea of the strategy, note that it makes sense to probe the
modulation in a slot if Bob, with a high probability, eventually obtains a valid detection
in that slot. Conversely, if a slot has a very low probability of being registered by Bob,
probing that slot is not only a waste but also the afterpulsing – due to Eve’s bright
pulses – unnecessarily increases the QBER. By manipulating the photonic frame, i.e.,
the train of Nf = 1075 legitimate weak coherent pulses (WCPs) returning from Alice
to Bob, Eve can control the timings of detection events in Bob. For this purpose, she
may either (i) use a low-loss channel to transfer the photon(s) in a WCP from Alice to
Bob and increase the chance of a click in that given slot, or (ii) block the WCP entirely
to decrease it. She multiplexes Trojan-horse pulses on (a subset of) the former slots as
depicted in figure 1(a) while keeping her laser shut in the latter slots.
Since the mean photon number of the WCPs arriving in Bob is rather low, a major
chunk of the slots would actually contain 0 photons, and obviously cannot result in a
detection event in Bob. Eve may increase her chance of attacking a slot, that eventually
yields a valid detection event, by sending a set of consecutive Trojan-horse pulses, here
called an attack burst with length Nab. However, this burst would also cause a large
amount of afterpulsing – noticeable even a few slots after its application. Eve’s remedy
to this is based on the fact that a successful click causes a deadtime in Bob’s APDs.
During the attack burst, Eve therefore tries to impose a deadtime in Bob from Alice’s
photons to mask the afterpulsing. To achieve that, she uses the low-loss channel to
transfer the Nab slots to Bob to increase the photon detection probability.
Since Nab can obviously not be too large, the deadtime imposition (which results
in a withdrawal of Ndt = 50 gates in Clavis2) may not always work during the attack
burst. Therefore, Eve also transfers another set of Nss slots on the low-loss channel,
called the substitution sequence, to keep the photon detection probability high after the
attack burst as well. We emphasize that Eve does not add any Trojan-horse pulses
during the substitution sequence.
In this scenario, the detection clicks in Bob’s APDs due to Alice’s photons (sent
over the low-loss channel in Nab+Nss slots) compete with those from the afterpulses: the
former may mask the latter, effectively lowering the error probability. Finally, another
optimization for Eve would involve drastically decreasing the detection probability
before these Nab + Nss slots – otherwise, a click in a slot before the attack burst slots
would result in the burst being encompassed in a deadtime, yielding no benefit to Eve.
By extinguishing a certain number of the WCPs (denoted as extinguished length Nel),
she may reduce these chances. Thus, her attack pattern can be thought of as a repetition
of the triad {Nel, Nab, Nss}, as illustrated by an example in figure 5(a).
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Figure 5. Simulating the effect of Eve’s attack on the QKD protocol operation.
(a) Eve manipulates a frame sent by Alice to Bob using the strategy described in
the main text (more details in the appendix). (b) Bob receives a ‘filtered’ frame,
as the effective channel transmission is T = TLL for all Nab (attack burst) and Nss
(substitution sequence) slots, and T = 0 for Nel (extinguished length) slots. We
assumed TLL = 0.9 in the present case. (c) Characteristic exponential decay of
probabilities due to afterpulsing in both D0 and D1 (red and blue) may be visualized
after the attack-bursts. (d) Final detection-probability patterns for D0 and D1. (e)
Subsequent click pattern just like in figure A1(e); out of the 9 slots (3 in D0 and 6
in D1, indicated by rotated-red and straight-blue squares, respectively) where clicks
occurred, Eve knows the basis choice of Bob in 4 of them (indicated by green star).
Evaluating the QKD frame manipulation
In the appendix, we describe a specific construction of Eve’s strategy using fast optical
switches [35] and low-loss channels for manipulating the QKD frame as explained above.
Due to this manipulation, Bob receives photons from Alice only during the attack bursts
and substitution sequences. This is apparent in figure 5(b); see the thick yellow and
green segments. Also, due to the afterpulses emanating from the attack burst slots,
the dark noise is not uniform throughout the frame. The overall noise probability in
the lth slot is given by nj(l) = dj + aj(l) − dj × aj(l) for j = 0 and 1, and is shown
in figure 5(c). In this expression, d0/1 represents the dark noise probability per gate
for D0/D1. The function aj(l) is computed by summing together the contributions of
all previous afterpulses until the lth slot; this is explained in more detail in Ref. [9].
Table A1 lists all the parameters for calculating the function nj(l).
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After considering both the photonic input and noise figure, we can evaluate the
final detection probabilities pj(l) = sj(l) + nj(l) − sj(l) × nj(l) for the entire frame,
as shown in figure 5(d). We explain the derivation of sj(l) and modelling of the click
events in D0 and D1 based on Bernoulli trials in the appendix. Figure 5(e) illustrates
the clicked gates found after taking double clicks and deadtime imposition into account.
Note that while Eve attacked only 20 out of 1075 slots, she knows Bob’s basis choice in
4 out of 9 slots that are going to be used in the formation of the raw key.
The QBER incurred by Alice and Bob is strongly dependent on the combination
{Nab, Nss, Nel} used by Eve during the operation of the QKD protocol. The quantum
channel transmission T and low-loss line transmission TLL directly influence the photon
number statistics µSARG04 in Alice and the observed detection rate γB in Bob, and also
indirectly affect both the QBER and Eve’s actual correlations IactE with the key shared
by Alice and Bob after error correction. For instance, long and frequent attacks (larger
Nab and smaller Nss, in a relative sense) yield high I
act
E but also high QBER. Similarly,
a large Nel preceding an attack burst may effectively increase I
act
E as the attacked slots
have lesser chances of being inside a deadtime period, but this may also decrease γB.
And a high TLL naturally implies higher γB, and perhaps lower QBER because the dark
noise is effectively decreased, however TLL cannot exceed 1.
Classical processing and optimizing the simulation
Let us first briefly recapitulate some essential information from the previous pages.
In section 3, we experimentally demonstrated the readout of Bob’s phase modulator
with a high accuracy. However, we also found that frequent Trojan-horse pulses would
result in a huge afterpulsing in Bob’s APDs which would reveal Eve’s presence easily.
In this section, we devised an intuitive strategy in which Eve manipulates the frame-
based communication of Clavis2 and attacks (with Trojan-horse pulses) only a small
but carefully-chosen subset of the slots in a frame. If Eve simultaneously ensures that
(i) the QBER q does not cross the abort threshold (q < qabort),
(ii) the portion of the raw key Eve actually knows is more than whatever Alice and
Bob estimate based on the security proof (IactE > I
est
E ), and
(iii) the deviation of the observed detection rate γobsB from the expected value in Bob
γexpB , given by δB =
∣∣∣∣1− γobsBγexpB
∣∣∣∣, is within tolerable limit (δB ≤ δmaxB ),
then her strategy succeeds. For satisfying these requirements, one needs to find an
optimal attack combination. We simulated different combinations {r, Nab, Nss, Nel};
with the new variable r ≤ 1 denoting the fraction of frames subjected to the Trojan-horse
attack. To elaborate, if r = 0.8, Eve randomly chose 80 out of 100 frames to attack with
the pattern imposed by a specific triad {Nab, Nel, Nss} in the manner shown in figure 5,
while the remaining 20 passed to Bob normally (in the manner shown in figure A1).
Due to probabilistic elements in the simulation, each run was performed for
nsim = 10000 frames to minimize stochastic fluctuations. In each run, slots that
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yielded clicks were collated and the average number of clicks per frame γobsB = (total
clicks)/nsim was calculated. A basis reconciliation procedure, as per the specifications
of SARG04 [22, 23], was then performed on the collated slots. This provided us with
the incurred QBER q and the fraction of valid slots3 in which Eve knows the secret
bit. From the former, we can calculate the leak due to error correction (EC) leakEC
then use it with the latter to bound Eve’s correlations IactE with the error-corrected key.
In particular, we assumed EC to work in the Shannon limit, i.e., leakEC = h(q), with
h(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) being the binary entropy.
To calculate the amount of privacy amplification that Alice and Bob do in SARG04
protocol, we evaluated the expression I(A : E) derived in Ref. [23] (equation (88)
therein); this provides IestE essentially. The derivation considers eavesdropping strategies
applicable against SARG04 when Alice employs an attenuated laser instead of a single-
photon source. The final expression is obtained while optimizing and lower-bounding
the secret key fraction attained by Alice and Bob.
One element considered in the calculation of IactE = I(A : E) is preprocessing : a
classical operation performed by Alice at the commencement of QKD that reduces both
Bob’s and Eve’s information, but in a more inimical manner for the latter than the
former [23,36]. Although Ref. [23] concludes that preprocessing in SARG04 helps Alice
and Bob only in a very specific regime, it does not explicitly state that preprocessing
should be avoided in other regimes. Since security proofs generally consider attacks that
maximize I(A : E) instead of I(B :E), the use of preprocessing by Alice may expose
a vulnerability exploitable via Trojan-horse attacks on Bob. Although preprocessing is
not implemented in Clavis2, we consider a case here to highlight the vulnerability.
Indicating the degree of preprocessing performed by Alice with a variable y, and
using all the relevant source, channel, and detector parameters introduced thus far, we
calculate IestE = 0.4844 for y = 0. This implies that Alice and Bob compress almost half
of their error-corrected key during privacy amplification. If however, Alice were to use
the maximum preprocessing (y = 0.5), then IestE = 0.1106. Note that the value of I
est
E
is independent of the incurred QBER. This is due to the fact that the attacks found
optimal in the security proof [23] are ‘zero-error’ attacks [3]. However, IestE depends on
the channel transmission, as also shown in Ref. [23]. The values here are calculated at
a fixed transmission (T = 0.25).
5. Results and discussion
In trying to search for optimal combinations {r, Nab, Nel, Nss} that satisfy all the
requirements listed in the previous section, we could find numerous cases where two of
the three conditions were easily satisfied (qabort ≈ 0.08 and δmaxB = 0.15 for Clavis2),
as shown in figure 6(a). However, it is clear that below the QBER abort threshold,
the final raw key correlations of Eve never surpass the estimate of Alice and Bob, i.e.,
IactE < I
est
E . One reason for the failure is that the detectors, especially D1, in Clavis2 are
3I.e., the slots kept by both Alice and Bob after the basis reconciliation.
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Figure 6. Performance of the simulated attack strategy in three different scenarios.
The QKD system aborts the protocol when the QBER q crosses a threshold qabort
(dashed red line) or the absolute deviation in the detection rate δB surpasses a
boundary δmaxB (dash-dotted blue line). To break the security under these constraints,
Eve’s actual correlations with the raw key IactE must exceed the estimate made by
Alice and Bob IestE (dotted green line). (a) Assuming D0 and D1 with characteristics
as that of the Clavis2 detectors (see Table A1) and that Alice does not apply any
preprocessing (y = 0), it seems difficult to satisfy the three conditions: q < qabort,
δB ≤ δmaxB , and IactE > IestE simultaneously. (b) Assuming both detectors behaving like
D0, some preprocessing (y = 0.4), and qabort ≈ 0.11, Eve can breach the security. (c) A
QKD system implemented with APDs having high efficiency and low noise is vulnerable
to Trojan-horse attack even without the preprocessing loophole. The optimal attack
combinations {r, Nab, Nss, Nel} that produced these results are also listed (see text
for details). All parameters and results were computed at T = 0.25 and TLL = 0.9.
quite noisy: even without an attack, i.e., with r = 0, the QBER q = 2.52%. Crafting an
attack with high r and optimal {Nab, Nss, Nel} may give Eve sufficiently high IactE but
the incurred QBER q >> qabort.
If we assume Bob’s detectors to have the same characteristics as that of D0 (in
Clavis2), and that Alice has preprocessing accidentally enabled, then Eve could breach
the security for qabort ≈ 0.11 as shown in figure 6(b). This is possible because the mutual
information between Eve and Bob scales by the same factor (given by 1 − y) as that
between Alice and Bob: in particular, at y = 0.4, Eve can surpass IestE = 0.1336.
In order to gauge the full power of this attack strategy and the dangers posed
by Trojan-horse attacks in general, we optimized the simulation for a Clavis2-like
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QKD system assumed to be fitted with a pair of APDs having high efficiency and
low noise. To be more precise, we assumed a pair of gated APDs with detection
efficiencies η0 = η1 = 0.25, thermal dark count probabilities d0 = d1 = 10
−5 per
gate, and a cumulative probability of obtaining random click after deadtime period
due to afterpulses to be < 10% (refer Table A1 for comparison). Note that detectors
with similar or even better characteristics have already been reported [37–40], thanks to
the recent advances in single-photon detection technology. Alternatively, mechanisms
to photoionize the trapped charges through sub-band energy illumination in order to
reduce afterpulsing have also been investigated [41]. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to
expect such characteristics in the next-generation gated APDs in Clavis2 or recently-
manufactured QKD devices. In such QKD systems, not only can Eve attack more often,
but also expect detections from photons to exceed those from afterpulses.
Figure 6(c) shows some optimized attacks (IestE = 0.5037 for the new detector
parameters and no preprocessing) that satisfy all the three conditions. In particular,
the positive leakage IactE − IestE , which is likely to be higher when preprocessing is also
used, implies that the security of the QKD system would be breached.
At lower channel transmission values (T < 0.25), attack regimes with a positive
leakage of final secret key may be found by means of more exhaustive optimization of the
simulation. At higher transmission values (T > 0.25), Eve’s attack should have better
chances of succeeding because Alice’s quantum states have more photons on average,
which raises the photonic detection probability (effectively suppressing the afterpulsing
probability) in Bob. However, the calculation of IestE in the security proof [23] is valid
only for channel lengths above 24 km, translating roughly into T < 0.33. More photons
from Alice also raise the chances of better photon-number-splitting attacks [11,25] which
would have to be countered by increasing IestE in privacy amplification, thereby requiring
Eve to work harder.
Nonetheless, it is clear that our attack on a QKD system equipped with less noisy
APDs would succeed at least for a range of channel transmissions. Furthermore, a
finite amount of preprocessing – supposed to provide more security to Alice and Bob –
would actually relax the constraints on Eve. Finally, the Trojan-horse strategy could
be combined with other hacking strategies, such as the after-gate attack [9], to enhance
Eve’s performance.
Possible improvements and extensions
An optimization over the complete space of all parameters that define the attack strategy
is out of the scope of this work, but a powerful adversary can easily do so and is likely
to find a new set of parameters with better attack performance. A possible extension
of the strategy is to manipulate the frames from Bob to Alice as well: more precisely,
to replace the legitimate bright pulses in the slots chosen for the attack burst with even
brighter ones. This would increase the chances that these slots eventually yield valid
detections in Bob. Unfortunately, an increased optical power, even if only for a few
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pulses in the frame, portends a risk for Eve because the monitoring detectors in Alice
may raise an alarm. However, if the monitoring system in Alice either does not function
properly, or can be fooled [42], then this method holds a lot of promise.
Yet another attack optimization is non-demolition measurement [43, 44] of the
photon numbers of the WCPs exiting Alice. Using it, Eve can simply withhold her
attack in the slots that contain 0 photons. This would reduce the dark counts (from
afterpulsing), yet effectively increase her correlations with the raw key. Finally, with
regards to the attack setup shown in figure 3, Eve could:
• gather more information (per phase modulation) by suitably tweaking her LO to
homodyne multiple back-reflections and improve the quality of the phase readout,
• periodically track the phase drift in her setup and adjust the relative phase between
the signal and LO, e.g., by using an extra phase modulator in the LO arm, to always
read out at an optimal phase difference, and/or
• enhance the success rate of discrimination by using better quantum measurement
strategies [45] and post-processing techniques, e.g., taking the difference of
consecutive pulses and then integrating over the properly-chosen time window.
These methods would facilitate ∼ 100% correlations between Eve’s homodyne output
and Bob’s modulation (see figure 4) while relaxing the brightness requirement, i.e.,
µE→B may be lowered, thus bringing down the afterpulsing probability. Another way
to achieve the same goal would be to employ longer wavelengths to attack (as the
afterpulsing response of the APDs is conjectured to be lower) and/or to depopulate the
traps by means of photoionization. Eve could try to use ∼ 1700 nm for her Trojan-horse
pulses to reduce afterpulsing. A CW illumination at a longer wavelength ∼ 1950 nm may
depopulate the traps (created due to the Trojan-horse pulses at some other wavelength)
by means of photoionization [41].
The attack setup shown in figure 3 can be used virtually against any kind of QKD
system, including CVQKD devices [27,28]; it only needs a careful delay and polarization
control and interferometric stability. By integrating a variable optical delay line and
splicing the different components, it could readily be assembled into a portable setup.
Finally, the strategy detailed above can also be attuned to attack entanglement-based
QKD systems that may not have proper safeguards against Trojan-horse attacks. More
significantly, it may be used even to break the BB84 protocol in such cases.
Countermeasures
Experimentally speaking, isolators and wavelength filters have been the most suitable
countermeasures against Trojan-horse type attacks for one-way QKD systems [4]. While
the former cannot be used in a two-way QKD system like Clavis2, the latter can certainly
be useful. In a related context, one must also scrutinize (high and unwarranted) back-
reflections from the interfaces inside the QKD device that could pose risks as explained
in section 2. With such analysis, it might be possible to incorporate Trojan-horse
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attacks into theoretical security proofs and neutralize them by correct levels of privacy
amplification. Moreover, security proofs should also carefully examine and quell the
undesired effects of preprocessing. Some technical countermeasures specifically for the
Clavis2 system could be:
• installing a watchdog detector with a switch at the entrance of Bob that randomly
routes a small fraction of incoming signals to this detector,
• opening the door for Eve for a smaller time duration, i.e., reducing the width of
phase modulation voltage pulse, and
• monitoring Bob’s APDs in real time [46].
Except the watchdog detector countermeasure, all others require modifications only in
the electronic control system and hence are recommended.
Note that Bob’s vulnerability to the Trojan-horse attack only arises because the
SARG04 protocol is used. For BB84 (including its decoy-state version), interrogating
Bob’s modulator gives Eve no advantage [4], except when this is used to counterattack
the four-state patch to the detector efficiency mismatch attacks [24, 47]. However both
BB84 and SARG04 are vulnerable to interrogating Alice’s modulator.
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the operation of a setup to launch a Trojan-horse
attack on a commercial QKD system from ID Quantique. Our objective is to read the
state of the phase modulator in Bob to break the SARG04 protocol. We have shown that
this phase readout can be performed in real-time with a high success rate, and analyzed
various constraints and problems in mounting a full attack on the system. These arise
mainly due to the afterpulsing noise induced in the single-photon detectors of Bob by
the bright Trojan-horse pulses from Eve. We have devised and numerically modeled
an attack strategy to keep the overall QBER (which increases due to the afterpulsing
noise) below the abort threshold, while allowing Eve to obtain the maximum possible
correlations with the raw key. Although, on our Clavis2 system, this does not exceed the
theoretical security estimate that Alice and Bob make about Eve’s correlations, we have
shown that similar or future QKD systems with less-noisy detectors may be hacked using
this strategy. We have also proposed some mechanisms to improve the performance
of the attack. With some simple modifications, our attack setup and strategy could
be applied against many other quantum cryptographic implementations, including
entanglement-based, continuous-variable, and measurement-device-independent QKD
systems. Finally, we have proposed both general and specific countermeasures that can
be easily adopted in most QKD systems.
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Appendix
Operation of plug-and-play QKD
Here we simulate the operation of the QKD system. A Clavis2 frame consists of
Nf = 1075 slots spaced 0.2µs apart. This implies Nf optical signals are sent by Bob to
Alice in the forward path of the plug-and-play scheme, Nf detection gates are opened by
Bob to measure the Nf weak coherent pulses (WCPs) coming back from Alice
4. Alice
attenuates these optical signals properly so that the mean photon number of the WCPs
(in the quantum channel) is as dictated by the protocol; for SARG04 the optimal value
is µSARG04 = 2
√
T , where T is the channel transmission [23].
By means of a Monte Carlo simulation based on experimental parameters, we
modelled the frame-based QKD operation from hereon. We created an array of random
positive integers that are Poisson-distributed to mimic (the photon numbers of) a
Clavis2 frame exiting Alice. Each pulse in the frame was stochastically subjected to
all the relevant transmission or detection events; to be precise, they were modelled by a
sequence of Bernoulli trials. For example, if the transmission of the quantum channel is
denoted by T , then each of the n photons in a pulse at Alice’s exit undergoes a Bernoulli
trial yielding success/1 [failure/0] with a probability of T [1− T ]. The total number
of photons in a pulse reaching Bob can then be evaluated as the sum of the outcomes
of all n trials. Similarly, for a pulse containing m photons impinging on an APD with
single-photon detection efficiency η, a detection click (success) is obtained if at least one
of the m Bernoulli trials yielded a 1.
Figure A1 charts the different events in Bob: right from the arrival of a photonic
frame to the registration of clicks, taking the withdrawal of Ndt = 50 gates (due to
deadtime) into account. The transmission of the quantum channel connecting Alice and
Bob is assumed to be T = 0.25 (with channel attenuation α = 0.2 dB/km, this would
imply ∼ 30 km long channel). The transmission inside Bob is TB = 0.45. The total
detection probabilities in figure A1(c) are calculated using pj(l) = sj(l) + dj − sj(l)× dj
for each slot l ∈ [1, Nf ] and for j = 0 and 1. In this expression, d0/1 represents the
dark count probability per gate for D0/D1. The photonic detection probability is
sj(l) = 1−(1− ηj)m(l) for j = 0 and 1; here m(l) is the number of photons impinging on
4In practice, Bob has an asymmetric interferometer as shown in figure 1(b) so an optical signal
actually consists of two (unequally bright) pulses. As it does not affect our analysis, we will use ‘signal’
and ‘pulse’ interchangeably to keep the explanation simple.
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Figure A1. Simulation of the physical-layer operation of SARG04 in Clavis2 at
channel transmission T = 0.25. (a) Photon number statistics of the WCP train (mean
photon number µSARG04 = 1) that reaches Bob after traversing the quantum channel.
In each of the 1075 slots, Alice randomly prepared one of four states Z0, Z1, X0, X1.
(b) Bob randomly chose Z or X basis in each slot too; if his basis coincides with the
preparation-basis of Alice, all photons in that slot are directed to one of D0 or D1
(depending on Alice’s secret bit). For dissimilar basis choice, photons are randomly
split across D0 and D1. (c) Resultant detection probabilities for D0 and D1 in each
slot/gate; calculation details are given in the main text. (d) Subsequent detection-click
pattern (vertical black bars with rotated-red or straight-blue squares).
Table A1. Various detection-related parameters in Clavis2. The numerical
parameters for the exponential decay due to afterpulses were estimated in Ref. [9].
The cumulative probability to get a random click after Ndt = 50 gates from afterpulses
alone surpasses 80%. The subscript j = 0/1 in a variable affiliates it to D0/D1.
D0 D1
Single-photon detection efficiency, ηj 0.12 0.10
Dark noise probability, dj 1.16× 10−4 3.63× 10−4
Afterpulse probability amplitude, A1j 3.572× 10−2 10.68× 10−2
Afterpulse decay constant, τ1j (µs) 1.159 0.705
Afterpulse probability amplitude, A2j 2.283× 10−2 5.054× 10−2
Afterpulsing decay constant, τ2j (µs) 4.277 3.866
a specific detector in the lth slot (shown in figure A1(b)), and η0 and η1 are the single-
photon detection efficiencies of D0 and D1, respectively. Table A1 lists the various
parameters relevant to the detectors.
Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography 20
polarization
timing
and
info extractor
1
4
3
2 BobAlice
FOSb
quantum channel MUX
1
4
3
2
FOSa
Eve low-loss line ( )TLL
Trojan-horse
attack apparatus
tap coupler
beam
dump
quantum channel
attacked slot T T( = )LL
substituted slot T T
extinguished slot T
( = )
( =0)
LL
slot no.



200 400 600 800 1000
N
ss
= 266
        
N
ab
= 7 N
el
= 35N
el0
=144
b)
a)
Figure A2. Technical implementation details of the frame manipulation strategy. (a)
Eve plants two bi-directional 2×2 fast optical switches FOSa and FOSb near Alice
and Bob, respectively. The solid orange line represents the quantum channel (normal
transmission T ) containing an optical tap along with the two switches. The dashed
cyan line is Eve’s highly-transmissive channel which may be implemented by a low-loss
delay line. The operational details of the switches during the quantum key exchange
are described in the text. (b) In a frame sent by Alice to Bob, Eve diverts all the slots
marked in green and yellow (four sets of Nab and three sets of Nss, respectively) onto
a highly-transmissive channel. The slots marked in grey (three sets of Nel and one
Nel0) are blocked. FOS: fast optical switch, MUX: multiplexer, ab: attack burst, ss:
substitution sequence, el : extinguished length.
Eve’s strategy
Figure A2(a) shows a possible full implementation of the Trojan-horse attack described
in section 4, by using off-the-shelf optical switches [35] and a low-loss line. The switches
are connected by two lines: the quantum channel containing an optical tap additionally,
and a highly-transmissive channel (with transmission TLL). If a slot l ∈ [1, Nf ] diverted
by Eve on the highly-transmissive channel had n photons at Alice’s exit, then it has
a high chance of having n photons at Bob’s entrance too. The low-loss line with the
characteristics we model (TLL = 0.9 instead of 0.25 for the normal line) currently does
not exist. However, its implementation can in principle be possible in the future, by
using an improved optical fiber or high-efficiency quantum teleportation.
When Bob sends a frame to Alice, the switches are in crossed positions (FOSb:
1 → 4 and FOSa: 2 → 3) so that the frame essentially traverses the quantum
channel undisturbed. The tap is used for obtaining polarization information and
synchronization, required later in preparation of the Trojan-horse pulses. Since the
pulses in the forward path are relatively bright, a few photons stolen would not be
noticed by Alice.
For the return path, i.e., from Alice to Bob, Eve manipulates the slots as determined
by the attack pattern of figure A2(b). This pattern is essentially a repetition of the
triad {Nab, Nel, Nss} imposed in the reverse direction (i.e., going from Nf to 1) on
an entire QKD frame. The number of unbroken triads that can fit inside a frame
is k = bNf/ (Nab +Nel +Nss)c, where b·c denotes the floor operation. This leaves
exactly Nu = Nf − k (Nab +Nel +Nss) unaccounted slots in the beginning of the frame;
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if Nu > Nab, then we add yet another attack burst Nab and extinguish the remaining
Nel0 = Nu − Nab slots, as also shown in figure A2(a) with k = 4 and Nu = 151.
Otherwise, we simply extinguish Nel0 = Nu slots.
Using this pattern, Eve physically manipulates the frame in the following way: slots
up to Nel0 are extinguished by being directed onto a beam dump (FOSa: 3 → 2 and
FOSb 4 → 2). The next Nab + Nss slots pass through the low-loss line (both FOSa
and FOSb in positions 3 → 1) to Bob. Using the Trojan-horse attack apparatus (see
figure 3), Eve reads Bob’s PM settings for the attack burst, i.e., the first Nab of these
slots. The remaining Nss slots, or the substitution sequence, simply travel to Bob via the
low-loss line. The switches then flip again for an extinguished length of Nel slots. This
sequence is repeated until the end of the frame is reached with the last Nab gates always
attacked. Attacking the last few slots causes less afterpulsing, because the detector
gates are not applied after the frame end.
References
[1] Bennett C H and Brassard G 1984 Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing
Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing
(Bangalore, India) p 175
[2] Gisin N, Ribordy G, Tittel W and Zbinden H 2002 Rev. Mod. Phys. 74 145
[3] Scarani V, Bechmann-Pasquinucci H, Cerf N J, Dusˆek M, Lu¨tkenhaus N and Peev M 2009 Rev.
Mod. Phys. 81 1301
[4] Vakhitov A, Makarov V and Hjelme D R 2001 J. Mod. Opt. 48 2023
[5] Gisin N, Fasel S, Kraus B, Zbinden H and Ribordy G 2006 Phys. Rev. A 73 022320
[6] Nauerth S et al 2009 New J. Phys. 6 065001
[7] Lydersen L, Wiechers C, Wittmann C, Elser D, Skaar J and Makarov V 2010 Nat. Photonics 4
686
[8] Li H W et al 2011 Phys. Rev. A 84 062308
[9] Wiechers et al 2011 New J. Phys. 13 013043
[10] Jain N et al 2011 Phys. Rev. Lett. 107 110501
[11] Jiang M S et al 2012 Phys. Rev. A 86 032310
[12] Saleh B E A and Teich M C 1991 Fundamentals of Photonics (Wiley, New York).
[13] Bethune D S and Risk W P 2000 IEEE J. Quantum Electron. 36 340
[14] Bennett C H, Bessette F, Brassard G, Salvail L and Smolin J 1992 J. Cryptology 5 3
[15] Breguet J, Mueller A and Gisin N 1994 J. Mod. Opt. 41 2405
[16] Townsend P 1998 IEEE Photon. Technol. Lett. 10 1048
[17] Rarity J G and Tapster P R 1992 Phys. Rev. A 45 2052
[18] Mueller A, Herzog T, Huttner B, Tittel W, Zbinden H and Gisin N 1997 Appl. Phys. Lett. 70 793
[19] Walenta N et al 2014 New J. Phys. 16 013047
[20] ETSI GS QKD 005 V1.1.1: “Quantum key distribution (QKD); Security proofs” (ETSI, 2010)
[21] Stucki D, Gisin N, Guinnard O, Ribordy G and Zbinden H 2002 New J. Phys. 4 41
[22] Scarani V, Ac´ın A, Ribordy G and Gisin N 2004 Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 057901
[23] Branciard C, Gisin N, Kraus B and Scarani V 2005 Phys. Rev. A 72 032301
[24] Makarov V, Anisimov A and Skaar J 2006 Phys. Rev. A 74 022313
[25] Brassard G, Lu¨tkenhaus N, Mor T and Sanders B C 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 1330
[26] Datasheet of Clavis2, available at ID Quantique website www.idquantique.com
[27] Jouguet P et al 2013 Nat. Photonics 7 378
[28] Khan I et al 2013 Phys. Rev. A 88 010302
Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography 22
[29] Liu Y et al 2013 Phys. Rev. Lett. 111 130502
[30] Silva T F et al 2013 Phys. Rev. A 88 52303
[31] Beller J 1998 OTDRs and Backscatter Measurements in Fiber Optic Test and Measurement, D.
Derickson, ed. (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ).
[32] Lydersen L et al 2011 Phys. Rev. A 84 032320
[33] Haitz R H 1965 J. Appl. Phys. 36 3123; Cova S, Lacaita A and Ripamonti G 1991 IEEE Electron.
Dev. Lett. 12 685
[34] Dudley J M, Genty G and Coen S 2006 Rev. Mod. Phys. 78 1135
[35] Nanona ultra-fast optical switch, www.bostonati.com; NanoSpeed, www.agiltron.com
[36] Kraus B, Gisin N and Renner R 2005 Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 080501
[37] Patel K A et al 2012 Electron. Lett. 48 111
[38] Walenta N et al 2012 J. Appl. Phys. 112 063106
[39] Restelli A, Bienfang J C and Migdall A L 2013 Appl. Phys. Lett. 102 141104
[40] Korzh B et al 2014 Appl. Phys. Lett. 104 081108
[41] Krainak M A 2005 Proc. Lasers and Electro-Optics (CLEO) 1 588
[42] Sajeed S, Radchenko I, Kaiser S, Bourgoin J-P, Monat L, Legre´ M and Makarov V to appear in
online proceedings of QCrypt 2014 (Paris, France)
[43] Xiao Y F et al 2008 Opt. Express 16 21462
[44] Braginsky V B and Khalili F Y 1996 Rev. Mod. Phys. 68 1
[45] Wittmann C et al 2008 Phys. Rev. Lett. 101 210501
[46] Silva T F, Xavier G B, Temporao G P and von der Weid J P 2012 Opt. Express 20 18911
[47] Qi B, Fung C-H F, Lo H-K and Ma X 2007 Quantum Inf. Comput. 7 73
